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Abstract
This thesis analyses the issues related to broadband development, investment
in Next Generation Networks (NGN) and regulation. The first chapter is a lit-
erature review on the determinants of adoption and usage of broadband, on
one side, and on the determinants of the investment incentives in NGN and
the impact of regulation, on the other side. The second and the third chap-
ters are theoretical contributions to the literature on investment in NGN and
regulation. We briefly describe the content of each chapter below.
First Chapter This study surveys the theoretical literature and empirical ev-
idence on two parallel and related issues regarding broadband development:
the demand-side determinants of broadband adoption and usage and the re-
lationship between investment incentives and regulation. The first section
presents the results found in the literature on the main drivers of broadband
adoption. We report also the empirical literature which attempts to disentan-
gle ”adoption” from ”usage” of broadband. Further, the effect of location on
adoption is examined, mainly regarding the rural/urban digital divide. Then,
the interaction between fixed and mobile broadband is analysed, particularly
discussing whether the adoption of fixed broadband and mobile broadband
follows similar or diverging patterns. The second section reviews the literature
regarding the determinants of the incentives to invest in broadband and their
relationship with the regulatory framework. We also report the most recent
studies on the main issues regarding the development of the Next Generation
Networks (NGN).
Second Chapter A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Li-
censed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent
has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all
urban areaswith similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of
demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access reg-
ulation regimes - full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network
is regulated), risk sharing - on investment incentives and social welfare. We
find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather
than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily
xv
happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-
added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from
a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.
Third Chapter We model the competition between an incumbent firm and
anOther Licensed Operator (OLO) in the broadbandmarket, where the incum-
bent has an investment option to build a Next Generation Network (NGN) and
it can do so by making a risk sharing agreement with the OLO, or alone. Dif-
ferently from other theoretical research, we discuss about two different kinds
of risk sharing contractual forms – basic risk sharing, where no side-payment
is given for the use of the NGN between co-investors, and joint-venture risk
sharing, where a side-payment is set by the co-investing firms – and we com-
pare them with the scenario in which the incumbent invests on a stand-alone
basis. Then, we consider the introduction of a late entrant and we examine the
related impact on the robustness of the risk sharing agreement and the equi-
librium results. We find that risk sharing can potentially be beneficial in terms
of competition and investments, but the number of firms involved matters and
so does the choice of the NGN access price, for insiders and outsiders of the
agreement. Although eventually the regulators’ objective is having no more
network duplication and all operators using the NGN, it might not be an opti-
mal strategy to start with all the firms in the market involved in a risk sharing
agreement, unless the insiders NGN access charge is constrained at zero. Even
when the presence of firms outside of the agreement force insiders to com-
pete more fiercely, there might be a concern with the potential exclusion of the
outsiders from the NGN. Therefore, a light regulation imposing no exclusion
would be advisable.
xvi
Chapter 2
Technology Investment and
Alternative Regulatory
Regimes with Demand
Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
Telecommunications markets are experiencing a period of drastic technolog-
ical development. The possibility to build a so-called Next Generation Net-
work (NGN) gives firms the chance to exploit extremely faster transmission
and thereby enrich their offer with more interactive and sophisticated services.
However, the actual existence and importance of a demand for NGN applica-
tions is often uncertain1. The technology has been available for a while now,
but given the high fixed costs needed to build the necessary infrastructure, and
the risks due to demand uncertainty and regulatory uncertainty, the NGN de-
ployment is progressing slowly in many countries.
The vexing issue as to how to provide firms with enough investment in-
centives, while eventually retaining the benefits of network development for
final consumers, is highly debated by industry actors, regulators and scholars.
In particular, access regulation is widely argued about its potential discourag-
ing effect on regulated firms’ investment. When obliged to share its network
elements with facilities-free rivals at a regulated access price, the incumbent
may feel reluctant to invest in NGN because of the spillover effect enjoyed
by the Other Licensed Operators (OLO). For these reasons, access regulation,
1See for instance The Economist (2010) about lack of demand for NGN services in the United
States.
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mainly in the form of mandatory unbundling, may induce less or later incum-
bent’s investment compared to an unregulated scenario, but also compared to
the socially desired level (Chang et al. (2003); Crandall and Singer (2003); In-
graham and Sidak (2003); Bourreau and Dog˘an (2005); Pindyck (2007); Grajek
and Ro¨ller (2011), Nardotto et al. (2012)). The European Commission seems
to acknowledge these concerns for future investments in NGN. In the Recom-
mendation C(2010) 6223 on “Regulated Access to NGANs” (September 2010),
the possibility of relaxing - if not eliminating - ex ante regulation when a risk
sharing agreement backs up the deployment of NGN is openly considered.
The issue of broadband investment and regulation has attracted and still at-
tracts a lot of research attention.2 Our paper contributes to this strand of litera-
ture by addressing the issue of access price setting when the incumbent has the
option to invest in NGN and investment returns in terms of demand increase
are uncertain. Using a model where a vertically integrated incumbent and an
OLO dynamically compete in the market for broadband access, we analyse the
effect of three different access regimes on the incentives to invest by the incum-
bent: full regulation (mandatory unbundling for NGN), partial regulation (no
mandatory unbundling for NGN) and risk sharing. We then compare their im-
pact on social welfare, balancing the effect of each regulatory regime on static
and dynamic efficiency.
In our paper, we follow the original set-up of broadband investment and
access regulation developed by Foros (2004).3 We develop a model with two
firms having different ability to offer value-added services, and analyse the im-
pact of access price regulation on the incumbent’s investment incentive. Dif-
ferently from Foros (2004), however, we adopt a dynamic model of technology
adoption and we include demand uncertainty for value-added NGN services.
Considering that NGN investment might fail to expand market demand, we
also assume that the OLO can possibly switch back to the copper network if
there is no demand for NGN applications and the access to copper is cheaper.
We then conduct our analysis comparing the impact on investment of three
alternative access regimes. In this respect, the paper closer to ours is Nitsche
and Wiethaus (2011). The authors analyse a simple two-stage framework with
identical firms, where the incumbent is the only firm entitled with investment
option and investment success in terms of demand increase is uncertain. Their
work compares the impact of different modes of regulation (access price based
on costs, risk sharing and regulatory holiday) in terms of investment extent
and consumer welfare outcomes. There are several differences between our
work and Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s one. Firstly, in their model, following
2Cambini and Jiang (2009) provide a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on broad-
band investment and access regulation.
3A similar approach has been recently used by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012). In their model the
authors analyse the incumbent’s incentive to invest under regulatory non-commitment, general-
izing the results by Foros (2004). In our paper, instead, we use a dynamic investment model and
demand uncertainty and we also compare different regulatory regimes in terms of their welfare
implications. Our analysis is thus complementary to the Mizuno and Yoshino’s one.
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Klumpp and Su (2010), the access charge is determined ex post from the equi-
librium quantities and it includes a partial allocation of the fixed costs borne by
the incumbent. In our model, the regulator establishes ex ante the level of ac-
cess price, via first-order conditions. As a consequence, the benchmark case for
access regulation in our model is a marginal cost-based rule, as in much of the
literature in this field (Foros (2004), Kotakorpi (2006) for instance). Secondly,
our setting is dynamic and we investigate the timing of investment in a con-
text with demand uncertainty, rather than the extent of the investment. More-
over, we are able to carry out a complete welfare analysis, whereas Nitsche
and Wiethaus (2011)’s work only gives an overview of the different modes of
regulation’s implications in terms of consumer welfare. Lastly, our model in-
cludes quality differentiation a` la Foros and considers its impact on equilibrium
results, while, in Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s model, firms are undifferenti-
ated.
The impact of uncertainty on the timing of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture development has also been analysed in several papers that feature dy-
namic race models between incumbent and entrant operators and focus on
specific access pricing regimes, mainly regulatory holidays (Hori and Mizuno
(2006), Hori and Mizuno (2009), Gans (2001), Gans (2007) and Vareda and Ho-
ernig (2010)). In our model, by contrast, we consider uncertainty in a dynamic
setting, but we focus on services-based competition, while taking into account
different possible regulatory regimes.
Our paper also differs from a recent strand of studies that analyse an invest-
ment game where both the incumbent and entrants have the option to invest.
Brito et al. (2012) examine the incentives of a vertically integrated firm (regu-
lated at wholesale level) to invest and give access to a new (upgraded) whole-
sale technology, that is not subject to access regulation. Bourreau, Cambini
and Dog˘an (2012) and Inderst and Peitz (2012a) analyse the incentives to mi-
grate from an old technology to a new one, and examine how wholesale access
conditions affect this migration. Finally, Manenti and Sciala` (2011) study the
impact of access regulation on entrant and incumbent’s investment and show
that, in absence of regulation, the incumbent would choose an access charge
to the new infrastructure that prevents resale-based entry, thereby overstimu-
lating entrant’s investment which may eventually turn out to be inefficiently
high.
Our model reveals that the differences in ability to provide value-added
services and their absolute values with respect to the overall level of demand
highly affect the investment choice. Since the OLO has the alternative to switch
back to the copper network instead of leaving the market entirely, we find, in
contrast to Foros (2004), that there are cases in which exclusion does not hap-
pen even when the incumbent is better in providing value-added services than
the OLO. In case of mandatory switch to the NGN, we find that the OLO re-
mains active in the market if and only if its ability to provide value-added ser-
vices is higher than the incumbent’s one. The equilibrium results show that the
35
investment is always undertaken later than in the social optimum and that the
presence of uncertainty has the effect of delaying the investment even further.
Full regulation lowers the investment incentives due to a hold-up problem of
the regulator who exploits the irreversibility of the incumbent’s investment ex
post. Due to a combination of competitive intensity and investment incentives,
we find that risk sharing is the most preferable regime from a consumer wel-
fare perspective, but also from a total welfare perspective for a large range of
parameters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model and the main findings under the three different regulatory regimes.
Section 3 summarises the paper and concludes.
2.2 The Model
We first present the basic features of the model. Then we present the results of
the following regimes: full regulation, where the access charges to the legacy
network and to the NGN are regulated; partial regulation, where only the ac-
cess charge to the legacy network is regulated; risk sharing. Finally we illus-
trate the welfare comparisons between the different cases.
2.2.1 The Basic Framework
Two firms compete downstream for the provision of broadband connectivity.
One firm is a vertically integrated incumbent, who owns the existing infras-
tructure, constituted by the copper network, and has the obligation to unbun-
dle the network elements to its competitor under access regulation. The access
fee to the existing infrastructure is assumed to be regulated at marginal cost.
The second firm is a downstream competitor, leasing lines from the incum-
bent. Both firms provide the same services via the existing network, e.g. the
conventional PC-centric services like www and email.
The incumbent firm has the option to invest in building a Next Generation
Network (NGN). Such networks allow firms for a drastic improvement of the
services provided, e.g. more speed in data transmission, enabling interactive
TV-centric and gaming broadband services, IP-based and high definition TV,
more capacity and faster connectivity.
The incumbent can decide at any time whether to invest in the NGN or
to keep on using the copper network. Its investment choice is a one-time de-
cision and it cannot be updated in a later period. Once it decides to invest,
the incumbent must build a network that covers the entire market. When we
talk about the entire market, we refer to regions that present roughly similar
demand structures, particularly regarding the level of uncertainty about the
NGN success. The rival can then decide whether to keep on using the copper
network, or to ask the incumbent for access to the NGN by paying an access
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fee. Alternatively, the incumbent and the entrant can jointly undertake and
share the cost of the investment under a risk sharing agreement. In this case,
we assume that each operator can use the NGN without any side payments.
Broadband services are sold by both operators to end-users at a fixed sub-
scription fee independent of actual usage and time connected. Hence firms
face downward sloping demand curves. Services provided by the two firms
through the copper network are perfect substitutes. The adoption of NGN
enriches the retail offer with value-added services. If the investment turns
out to be successful, the chance to obtain value-added services increases con-
sumers’ willingness to pay and shifts demand curves upwards for both firms.
Consumers’ quality perception of the value-added services is differentiated be-
tween the two firms, so the respective market shares will be affected. In case of
failure, there is no shift in demand.
We assume that there is Cournot competition in the retail market and the
quantity sold is interpreted as the number of subscriptions. We assume that
the access to the copper network is regulated at marginal cost level and there
is no regulation in the retail market. Access pricing is the only regulatory tool
in the context here, and, since the existing regulatory methods are designed
for linear access pricing, we assume a linear access price. Furthermore, in line
with the existing EU regulatory framework, we assume that the access charge
to the new broadband network has to cover at least the network operating
cost, so it cannot be set below marginal cost.4 Moreover, the regulator has an
imperfect ability to make credible commitment, i.e. it is able to commit to a
certain regulatory regime (full or partial regulation), but he cannot commit to
the NGN access charge level before the investment is deployed.5
In order to reflect the need to foster the adoption of NGN in the current
state of market uncertainty, we examine the conditions for which all operators
decide to use the NGN as soon as it is deployed even though its success is
still uncertain. Regulators want to make the switch to NGN faster, eventually
avoiding the cost duplications arising from the overlapping use of copper net-
work and NGN. Since the regulator cannot commit to a certain level of access
charge before the investment is deployed, the decision upon the access condi-
tions are taken after the investment stage. We assume that the regulator sets
a sort of state-dependent access charge, as in Vareda (2010), that will adapt to
the demand conditions once they become common knowledge with the phase
of retail market competition.6
4As we will show in next paragraphs, this restriction, aside from being more realistic, is due to
the OLO’s option to switch back to the ”old” copper network. Tomake our analysis more complete,
we will relax this assumption in section 2.2.4, forcing the OLO to switch to the NGN.
5Brito et al. (2010) consider how two-part tariffs can mitigate the regulatory commitment prob-
lem.
6State-dependent access rules are also adopted in Vareda (2010). The author analyses the impact
of access regulation when an entrant has to decide whether to invest in a telecommunications
network or to ask for access, and the regulator cannot observe its efficiency level. The paper shows
that the regulator must set access prices contingent on demand, in order to induce the entrant to
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In theory, the OLO can decide to use the NGN immediately after the in-
vestment is deployed, before the state of demand is revealed; or it can wait
and see what is the true state of demand, and then decide which network to
use. In order to limit the ex post entrant’s opportunism, i.e. the possibility
that the entrant leaves the NGN if the realised demand happens to be (very)
low, the regulator establishes access conditions under a long term contract, so
that after the initial decision to switch to the new network, the OLO will con-
tinue to use the NGN. Therefore, we focus our analysis on access conditions
for which the OLO switches to the NGN immediately after the investment is
deployed and does not change its decision after the demand is revealed. Given
the difficulties in the take-off of NGN networks in the current state of market
uncertainty, indeed, analysing the circumstances under which more industry
players would actually decide to initially join and use the NGN thereafter is a
matter of greater social interest. In an extension of the model at section 2.2.4,
we analyse the implications of a compulsory switch to the NGN for the OLO.
The timing of the model is the following (see Figure 2.1):7
0
t
Decision on
regulatory regime
(partial or full regulation)
Incumbent considers to
invest in NGN, but does
not do so
t′
Incumbent
invests in NGN
period t’
NGN
created
Demand
realises
Access charge is set
(with full regulation
by regulator, with
partial regulation
by incumbent)
OLO
may decide
on usage
of network,
or wait
Retail
competition
Figure 2.1: Timing of the Model
reveal its efficiency level.
7A similar structure of the game has been adopted by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012).
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Stage 0 At any time, the incumbent firm (together with the OLO, in case of risk
sharing) decides whether to invest in building a NGN or to keep on using the copper
network;
Stage 1 Once the investment in the new network is deployed, with full access regu-
lation (partial access regulation), the regulator (the incumbent firm) chooses the access
price to be paid by the OLO to use the NGN;
Stage 2
- At any time after the access conditions have become common knowledge, the OLO
decides whether to keep on using the legacy network or upgrade and ask access to the
NGN;
- The state of demand is revealed and the two firms compete a` la Cournot in the retail
market.
Notice that in the risk sharing case, Stage 1 and the first bullet point of Stage
2 are absent.
Demand Side
Consumers have unit demand. Their valuation of a firm’s service is divided
into two parts: one is for the basic broadband services and the other is for the
value-added services running on NGN. Following Foros (2004), we assume the
former is heterogeneous but the latter is homogeneous. Therefore a represen-
tative consumer’s valuation of firm i’s service is given by:{
v + βi with probability γ, case of success
v with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Subscripts i = 1, 2 indicate incumbent and OLO, respectively. Here v is
interpreted as the consumer’s willingness to pay for the basic service without
new technology and is assumed to be uniformly distributed in (−∞, a]. Fol-
lowing Foros (2004), we allow for negative values of v in order to avoid corner
solutions where all consumers enter the market. βi describes firm i’s ability
to offer value-added services after a successful investment and is assumed to
belong to the interval (0, g) with g = a − c > 0, where c is the marginal cost
for the provision of value-added services. Unlike Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)
and similarly to Foros (2004), firms’ abilities are differentiated. Notice also that
there is no chance here for an overall ”drastic” or ”non-drastic” investment, as
in Brito et al. (2012), since the market is never covered.8 As in Nitsche and
Wiethaus (2011), market success is uncertain: the investment increases con-
sumers’ willingness to pay by βi with a probability equal to γ, with γ ∈ (0, 1);
or, consumers’ willingness to pay does not increase at all, even though NGN
8Brito et al. (2012) use a Hotelling framework for the demand, which implies the possibility of
all consumers preferring one firm to the other.
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enhances the quality of services, with a probability equal to (1− γ).
The subscription fee charged by firm i is pi. A representative consumer
buys from firm i other than firm j (j = 1, 2 and j 6= i) if the following condi-
tions are satisfied:{
v + βi − pi > v + βj − pj with probability γ, case of success
v − pi > v − pj with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Therefore the firms’ quality-adjusted prices P should be equal if both firms
are active in the market:{
pi − βi = pj − βj = P with probability γ, case of success
pi = pj = P with probability (1 − γ), case of failure
Consumers whose willingness to pay for the basic service v is no lower
than the quality-adjusted price P enter the market, so there are a − P active
consumers. The total quantity provided by firms is Q = q1 + q2, so we have
Q = a− P . Thus the inverse demand functions faced by the firms are:
• case of success {
ps1 = a+ β1 − q
s
1 − q
s
2
ps2 = a+ β2 − q
s
1 − q
s
2
• case of failure {
pf1 = a− q
f
1 − q
f
2
pf2 = a− q
f
1 − q
f
2
With the superscripts s and f we denote the case of investment’s success
and failure, respectively. Note that psi here is a quality-adjusted Cournot price,
which captures firm i’s ability to provide value-added services. Since such
abilities are differentiated between the two firms, the quality-adjusted prices
differ between the incumbent and the OLO, in case of success. The demand for
basic services running on the copper network, pCi is the same as the demand in
case of failure, so we have that{
pC1 = a− q
C
1 − q
C
2
pC2 = a− q
C
1 − q
C
2
Supply side
A local connection to an end user is composed of twomain elements, namely,
a local line and a line card. The first cost is borne by the network owner for
maintaining the daily operation of the essential input and is normalised to 0 in
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our model without loss of generality. The second cost, incurred to provide ser-
vices to end users at retail level, is assumed to be constant and equal to c > 0.
We assume that a market for the broadband access service exists, i.e. a > c.
The access charge to the copper network and to the NGN are denoted with rC
and rl, respectively, where the superscript l = P, F corresponds to the cases of
partial regulation and full regulation, respectively. The level of access charge
is decided by the incumbent, in case of partial regulation, or by the regulator,
in case of full regulation.
We assume that the regulator sets the access charge after the investment is
deployed, being aware of the presence of demand uncertainty. Hence, the ac-
cess charge to the NGN becomes rlf in case of failure and rls in case of success.9
The investment in NGN entails a quadratic adoption cost given byCi(m,∆) =
m2∆2φ/2. ∆ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor determined by the new-technology
adoption date. Here we use the same notation and interpretation as in Bour-
reau and Dog˘an (2005) that ∆ = exp(−δt) where δ is the discount rate nor-
malised to 1 and t denotes time. ∆ reflects the investment timing: a higher ∆
corresponds to an earlier investment. The extent of network updating is rep-
resented by m ∈ [0, 1]. In our setting, the incumbent chooses ∆ optimally and
invests in the whole network, i.e. m = 1, so Ci(∆) = ∆
2φ/2. φ is a positive
cost parameter. We assume the following: d
d∆C ≥ 0 and
d2
d∆2C > 0. Notice that
since the investment cost decreases with time, there is no case in which there is
no investment in this setting, unlike in Brito et al. (2012).
The ex ante profits of the two firms are the following:{
pil1 = (1−∆)pi
C
1 +∆(γpi
ls
1 + (1− γ)pi
lf
1 )
pil2 = (1−∆)pi
C
2 +∆(γpi
ls
2 + (1− γ)pi
lf
2 )
Here, firms’ profits before the investment, denoted by the superscript C in
the equations above to represent the use of the copper network, are equal to:{
piC1 = (p
C
1 − c)q
C
1 + r
CqC2
piC2 = (p
C
2 − c)q
C
2 − r
CqC2
Firms’ profits after investing in NGN, provided that the OLO also decides
to use the new infrastructure, are different depending on the true state of de-
mand.
• case of success{
pils1 = (p
ls
1 − c)q
ls
1 + r
lsqls2 − α
l∆φ/2
pils2 = (p
ls
2 − c)q
ls
2 − r
lsqls2 − (1− α
l)∆φ/2
9We have also solved the case where the regulator sets a single access charge for the NGN,
independent of demand. We discuss the solution of this case in footnote ??.
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• case of failure:{
pilf1 = (p
lf
1 − c)q
lf
1 + r
lf qlf2 − α
l∆φ/2
pilf2 = (p
lf
2 − c)q
lf
2 − r
lf qlf2 − (1 − α
l)∆φ/2
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents the way in which the investment cost is
shared between the two firms. So we have that αP = αF = 1 and αRS ∈ (0, 1),
because in case of partial regulation or full regulation the investment is under-
taken by the incumbent alone, while in case of risk sharing the investment cost
is somehow split among the two firms.
The following assumption is made for the model.
Assumption 2.1. rF ≥ 0 and rC = 0
This constraint imposes a lower bound limit to the NGN access price set by
the regulator, rF , which cannot be lower than the network operation marginal
cost, as in Foros (2004). In other words, the incumbent must have a non-
negative price cost margin on its sale to the OLO if the NGN access market
is regulated. In the second part of Assumption 3.1, we assume that the access
fee to the copper network, rC , is regulated at marginal cost level. This second
assumption restricts our attention to the problem of access price setting in the
NGN market and reflects the current situation in many countries, where the
regulation of the legacy network access charge is strictly cost-based.
Social Welfare
The social welfare function faced by the regulator at the moment of the
access fee setting is composed of a pre-investment part and a post-investment
part, with l = P, F,RS, in the following way:
E(W ) = (1−∆)WC +∆E(W l)
with
WC =
(
a− pC1
2
qC1 +
a− pC2
2
qC2 + pi
C
1 + pi
C
2
)
E(WN,l) = γ
(
a+ β1 − p
l,s
1
2
ql,s1 +
a+ β2 − p
l,s
2
2
ql,s2 + pi
l,s
1 + pi
l,s
2 −∆φ/2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a− pl,f1
2
ql,f1 +
a− pl,f2
2
ql,f2 + pi
l,f
1 + pi
l,f
2 −∆φ/2
)
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Stage 2: Retail Market Competition
Firms compete under Cournot competition in the retail market. The result-
ing equilibrium quantities in this segment are:
• Before investment
qC∗1 =
a− c
3
, qC∗2 =
a− c
3
• After successful investment
qls∗1 =
a− c+ rls + 2β1 − β2
3
, qls∗2 =
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
• After unsuccessful investment
qlf∗1 =
a− c+ rlf
3
, qlf∗2 =
a− c− 2rlf
3
with l = P, F,RS denoting the different regulatory regimes.
We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2. 2βi ≥ βj , ∀i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j
The above inequality implies that the difference in ability to provide value-
added services between firms is not too large. Therefore with any given access
price rl, each firm’s quantity is a non decreasing function with respect to the
investment. Under this assumption, the incumbent cannot use the investment
in NGN as a foreclosure tool (Foros (2004)).
Stage 2: the OLO chooses whether to use the NGN
Ex ante, the OLO decides to ask access to theNGN only if the expected prof-
its fromdoing so are not lower than the profits obtainable by providing services
through the copper network, whose access price is regulated at marginal cost
level:
E(pil2) = γpi
ls
2 + (1 − γ)pi
lf
2 ≥ pi
C
2
with l = P, F,RS.
Once we insert the equilibrium quantities, this inequality implies that:
γ
(
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c− 2rlf
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.1)
If the above condition is satisfied, the OLOwill switch to the NGN once the
investment is deployed, but its success is still uncertain. In this case, the OLO
does not behave opportunistically and use the NGN even in case of failure.
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Notice that the OLO would be indifferent to the relative balancing of the
access charges in case of failure and success, as long as the expected value of
profits respects Condition 2.1, but we restrict our analysis to the case where
using the NGN gives at least as much profit as the copper network to the OLO.
We impose this restriction to focus on the most plausible equilibrium and to
make the case of partial regulation readily comparable to the case of full regu-
lation. Following this restriction, in case of failure it must be true that:
(
a− c− 2rlf
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.2)
where the left hand side of the equation is the profit with the NGN and the
right hand side is the profit with copper network.
Following from the assumption that the copper network access price is reg-
ulated at marginal cost level, Condition 2.2 requires that:
rlf = rC = 0with l = P, F,RS (2.3)
Therefore, the access fee in case of failure will respect Condition (2.3) and
profits will be the same aswith the copper network under all regulatory regimes:
pilf∗1 =
(
a− c
3
)2
, pilf∗2 =
(
a− c
3
)2
After substituting the expression for pilf∗2 , we can simplify the OLO’s ex
ante constraint 2.1 in the following way:
(
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.4)
2.2.2 Full Regulation
We consider this case as a benchmark for cost-based regulation, where the reg-
ulator chooses the access charge by maximising a standard welfare function.
In our case, cost-based regulation translates in marginal cost pricing, so the
regulator only ensures to cover the incumbent’s operating costs.
Stage 1: the regulator sets the access price to the NGN
In this case, the regulator sets the access rule to the NGN in order to max-
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imise social welfare. Its objective function after investment is the following:
E(WNF ) =γ
(
(qFs∗1 + q
Fs∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFs∗1 )
2 + rFsqFs∗2 −∆φ/2 + (q
Fs∗
2 )
2
)
(1− γ)
(
(qFf∗1 + q
Ff∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFf∗1 )
2 −∆φ/2 + (qFf∗2 )
2
)
We remind that rFf = 0 by Condition 2.3.10 The first-order condition with
respect to rFs gives the access price as:
rFs∗ = c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2
c−a < 0 is a necessary condition for a broadbandmarket to exist. If β1 > β2
so much that 4β1 − 5β2 > a − c, then the solution to the first-order condition
given by the expression above is positive, rFs∗ > 0, implying that the regulator
sets an above cost access charge.
If, otherwise, the incumbent is worse than the OLO in offering value-added
services, β1 ≤ β2, or if it is better in offering value-added services but not by
a great extent, β1 > β2 but 4β1 − 5β2 < a − c, the solution to the first-order
condition is lower than the incumbent’s marginal cost of network operations,
i.e. rFs∗ < 0. The regulator, indeed, not only values the fact that the OLO is
able to increase demand through β2, as also the incumbent does through β1, but
it also values that the OLO’s presence increases competition downstream. This
is the reason why, in order to encourage the OLO’s participation into the NGN
market, the regulator may set a below-cost access charge. However, rFs∗ < 0
contradicts Assumption 3.1, according to which rFs∗ ≥ 0, so in this case we
will impose rFs∗ = 0, such that optimal regulated access price will be set equal
to the marginal cost.
The access price in case of full regulation is as following:
rF∗ =
{
0 if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2 otherwise
By substituting the values for rF∗ into the expressions for the equilibrium
quantities, we obtain the following expected quantities:
E(qF∗1 ) =
{
γ
(
a−c+2β1−β2
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
γ2(β1 − β2) + (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
otherwise
10In case of failure, the regulated access charge is set at the marginal cost level. From a policy
point of view, it would be more suitable and less distorsive to use other instruments rather than
the access charge to help covering investment costs, i.e. public subsidies, in case of lack of demand
for value-added services.
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E(qF∗2 ) =
{
γ
(
a−c+2β2−β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
γ(a− c+ 4β2 − 3β1) + (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
otherwise
OLO’s ability β2
0 g
4β1
5 −
a−c
5
3β1
4 −
a−c
6
if β1 >
2(a−c)
3
Exclusion operated
by the regulator
rF∗ = 4β1 − 5β2 − a + c
rF∗ = 0
Figure 2.2: Full Regulation
From the above equations we can see that: when 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a − c, the
expected equilibrium quantities are positive, given a− c > 0 and Assumption
2.4; when 4β1 − 5β2 > a − c, on one side, the incumbent’s expected quantity
is unambiguously positive - because a − c > 0 and β1 > β2 in this case -, and
on the other side, the positive sign for the OLO’s quantity is guaranteed by
Condition 2.4.11
Notice that Condition 2.4 here implies that the regulator sets access condi-
tions in such a way not to exclude the OLO from the market, when the OLO
has a lower ability in offering value-added services with respect to the incum-
bent, although it is equally efficient on the cost side. This case appears to be
more realistic and in line with the institutional framework in Europe.12
Simple algebra identifies the range for β2 for which it is possible to have
a positive regulated access price and the OLO active in the NGN market alto-
gether. Such range of parameters is:
3β1/4− (a− c)/6 ≤ β2 < 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
where the right hand side corresponds to the condition for an above cost ac-
cess price, and the left hand side corresponds to the condition for non-exclusion
of the OLO. This range of parameters exists only if β1 > 2(a − c)/3. For all
β1 ≤ 2(a− c)/3, the threshold value for β2 to have non-exclusion and positive
access price is higher than the threshold necessary to have a positive regulated
11Recall that Condition 2.4 ensures the ex post convenience for the OLO to use the NGN in any
state of demand.
12The European Commission (2002, page 117 − 119), indeed, has adopted the standard of
Equally Efficient Operator (EEO) in the context of access regulation and price test. Besides that,
demand factors are less observable and much more volatile, so we would not expect the regulator
to base its decisions on access price on demand factors so heavily as to exclude an EEO from the
market, most of all in a situation where uncertainty plays a central role.
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access price in the first place, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Intuitively, as long as the OLO’s ability is higher than the incumbent’s one,
the regulator favours the OLO’s participation into the market through a low
access price, i.e. setting the access charge equal to the marginal cost. The reg-
ulator starts setting an above cost access charge when the incumbent’s ability
in boosting the demand becomes considerably higher than the OLO’s one.13 In
this case the OLO remains active in the market as long as its ability is above
some minimum threshold, 3β1/4− (a− c)/6 ≤ β2.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing
The incumbent will have different objective functions depending on the
parameters. When 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a − c, we have that r
F∗ = 0. Therefore the
incumbent makes no profit in the upstream market and its objective function
is:
max
∆F
E(piF1 ) = (1−∆
F )
(
a− c
3
)2
+
∆F
(
γ
(
a− c+ 2β1 − β2
3
)2
+ (1 − γ)
(
a− c
3
)2)
− (∆F )2φ/2
When 4β1 − 5β2 > a − c, we have that r
F∗ > 0, then the incumbent’s
objective function is:
max
∆F
E(piF1 ) =(1−∆
F )
(
a− c
3
)2
+
∆F
(
γ(2(β1 − β2)
2 + (c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2)(a− c+ 4β2 − 3β1))+
(1− γ)
(
a− c
3
)2)
− (∆F )2φ/2
The two first-order conditions with respect to investment timing ∆F give
the following solution:
∆F∗ =
{
(2(a−c)(2β1−β2)+(2β1−β2)
2)γ
9φ if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
(−72(β1−β2)
2+9(7β1−9β2)(a−c)+9β2(7β1−8β2)−10(a−c)
2)γ
9φ otherwise
This is the incumbent optimal investment timing as long as the conditions
((2(a − c)(2β1 − β2) + (2β1 − β2)
2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 and ((−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 −
13This result is in line with Mizuno and Yoshino (2012), who also find that, when the degree
of spillover is small, i.e. when the OLO has a lower ability to offer value-added services, the
incumbent has the incentive to overinvest in order to obtain an above cost access charge from the
regulator.
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9β2)(a− c) + 9β2(7β2 − 8β2)− 10(a− c)
2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied.
In line with Foros (2004), here we find that the optimal investment timing
chosen by the incumbent is negatively correlatedwith the OLO’s ability to pro-
vide value-added services, i.e. d
dβ2
∆F∗ < 0. When the regulated access price
is set equal to the marginal cost, the incumbent has no profit by leasing lines
to the OLO in the upstreammarket. Therefore the incumbent’s investment is a
pure spillover, increasing with the OLO’s ability to exploit the new technology.
When the regulated access price is positive, the investment decreases with the
OLO’s ability. So in both cases, the better is the OLO, the later the incumbent
tends to invest.
When the probability of success increases, the incumbent’s incentive to in-
vest in the NGN decreases less rapidly with the OLO’s ability, d
2
dβ2dγ
∆F∗ < 0,
but also the investment is made earlier d
dγ
∆F∗ > 0. This happens because,
other things being equal, a higher probability of success gives the incumbent
overall higher incentives to invest. Therefore, the effect for which an increase
in the OLO’s ability determines a decrease in the incumbent’s investment in-
centive becomes less strong if the probability of success is higher.
The socially optimal investment timing
If we substitute all equilibrium solutions into the welfare function, the first-
order condition with respect to∆FW gives the following result:
∆FW =
{
(8(a−c)(β1+β2)+11(β2−β1)
2+8β1β2)γ
18φ if 4β1 − 5β2 < a− c
((a−c)2+9(2β2−β1)
2+18β1(β1−β2)+18β2(a−c))γ
18φ otherwise
This is the socially optimal investment timing as long as the conditions
(8(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β2 − β1)
2 + 8β1β2)γ/(18φ) ≤ 1 and (((a− c)
2 +9(2β2 −
β1)
2 + 18β1(β1 − β2) + 18β2(a− c))γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied.
2.2.3 Partial Regulation
Stage 1: the incumbent chooses the access price to the NGN
The incumbent’s profit function after investment is:
E(piP1 ) = γ((q
Ps∗
1 )
2 + rPsqPs∗2 ) + (1− γ)(q
Pf∗
1 )
2 −∆φ/2
Remind that rPf∗ = 0, by Condition 2.3. We analyse the situation in which
the incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the OLO, differently from
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) who model the partial regulation case as a Nash
bargaining. Considering Condition 2.4, the incumbent’s profit maximisation
gives three parameters range that determine different values for the access
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price chosen by the firm, as shown in Figure 2.3:
rPs∗ =
{
a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10 if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3 and 6β2 < 5β1
2β2−β1
2 if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
OLO’s ability β2
0 g5β1
6
β1 +
5(a−c)
6
rPs∗ =
(
a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10
)
(Exclusion occurs)
rPs∗ =
2β2−β1
2
rPs∗ =
(
a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10
)
Figure 2.3: Partial Regulation
When β2 is higher than β1 by a considerable extent, i.e. 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥
(a − c)/3, the OLO earns higher profits in the NGN market, paying the un-
regulated access charge, than in the outside option. Therefore, the incumbent
charges the access price that maximises its profits and allows the greatest rent
extraction from the OLO in the upstream market. The parameter threshold
2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3 derives from Condition 2.4, once inserted the expres-
sion for the unregulated access price into the equilibrium quantities.
If 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a − c)/3, the corresponding expected equilibrium quan-
tities are the following:

E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
2 +
7β1−2β2
10
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) = γ
(
2(β2−β1)
5
)
+ (1 − γ)
(
a−c
3
)
For intermediate values of the quality parameters, the incumbent will lower
the access price down to the point where Condition 2.4 is verified with equal-
ity, once considered the equilibrium quantities. When β1 is not considerably
higher than β2 - as defined by the second parameter threshold 6β2 ≥ 5β1 (see
Appendix 2.A for the derivation of the parameters threshold) - the incumbent’s
profit from charging the constrained access price to the NGN is higher than the
profit from exclusion.
In this case, we have an intermediate parameters range such that 2(β2 −
β1)/5 < (a − c)/3 and 6β2 ≥ 5β1 (see Figure 2.3), that yields the following
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expected equilibrium quantities:
{
E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
3 +
β1
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) =
a−c
3
Finally, when the incumbent is considerably better in offering value-added
services, it prefers to exclude the OLO from the NGN market.
Hence, for 6β2 < 5β1, we obtain:{
E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
3 +
2β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) =
a−c
3
Notice that since the OLO’s outside option is using the copper network
rather than leaving the market entirely, unlike in Foros (2004), the OLO gets
better wholesale access conditions. In Foros (2004), the incumbent always
charges the unconstrained access price, which excludes the entrant whenever
the entrant’s ability to exploit the new network is not higher than the incum-
bent’s ability. In this setting, for the parameters range β1+5(a−c)/6 > β2 > β1,
the OLO is better than the incumbent in offering value-added services, and the
incumbent charges an access price which is lower than the unconstrained ac-
cess price. Furthermore, for the parameters range β1 > β2 ≥ 5β1/6, the incum-
bent is better than the OLO in offering value-added services, but it charges an
access price that keeps the OLO active in the NGN market. Only for values of
the parameters such that 5β1/6 > β2 there is exclusion of the OLO.
Proposition 2.1. Under the assumptions rC = 0 and 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with
i 6= j), when the OLO has the outside option to use the regulated copper network
rather than leaving the market entirely, there is a range of parameters for which, absent
regulatory intervention, there is no exclusion in the provision of value-added services,
even if the incumbent’s ability is higher than the OLO’s ability in offering such ser-
vices.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing ∆
After inserting rPs∗, qP∗1 and q
P∗
2 into the incumbent’s profit function, the
first-order condition of the profit maximisation with respect to ∆ returns the
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following investment timings:
∆P∗ =


(25(a−c)2+9(10β1(a−c)+(3β1−2β2)
2+4β1β2))γ
180φ if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
(3β21+2(a−c)(β1+2β2))γ
12φ if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
(4β1(a−c+β1))γ
9φ if 6β2 < 5β1
This is the optimal investment timing chosen by the incumbent as long as
the conditions ((25(a−c)2+9(10β1(a−c)+(3β1−2β2)
2+4β1β2))γ)/(180φ) ≤ 1,
((3β21 + 2(a− c)(β1 + 2β2))γ)/(12φ) ≤ 1 and ((4β1(a− c+ β1))γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are
satisfied.
We find that, when the OLO participates in the NGN market, the invest-
ment timing is positively correlated with its ability to provide value-added
services, d
dβ2
∆P∗ > 0. Since the incumbent seeks to capture some rent from
the OLO, the higher the OLO’s ability is, the earlier the incumbent invests,
hoping to earn from access rents in the upstream market, in case of success-
ful investment. This effect is stronger, the higher the probability of success,
d2
dβ2dγ
∆P∗ > 0. Also, unsurprisingly, the investment is made earlier in time,
the higher the probability of success, d
dγ
∆P∗ > 0.
The socially optimal investment timing
As a benchmark for comparison, we now evaluate the socially optimal in-
vestment timing. The social welfare function can be written as:
E(WP ) = (1−∆)WC +∆E(WNP )
where E(WNP ) is the after-investment expected welfare with partial regula-
tion - the superscript N stands for NGN - and it is given by:
E(WNP ) =γ
(
(qPs∗1 + q
Ps∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qPs∗1 )
2 + rPs∗qPs∗2 − (∆)φ/2 + (q
Ps∗
2 )
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(qPf∗1 + q
Pf∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qPf∗1 )
2 − (∆)φ/2 + (qPf∗2 )
2
)
The first term inside the brackets represents the consumer surplus, the last
term is the OLO’s profit and the remaining ones are the profit earned by the in-
cumbent. After inserting all equilibrium solutions into E(WP ), the first-order
conditions with respect to∆P yield the following results in the different cases:
∆PW =


(−5(a−c)2)γ
72φ +
(76(β2−β1)
2+β1(55β1+20β2)+(130β1+20β2)(a−c))γ
200φ if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
(9β21+4(a−c)(3β1+2β2))γ
24φ if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
(11(β1−β2)
2+8(a−c)(β1+β2)+8β1β2)γ
18φ if 6β2 < 5β1
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The superscriptW stands for the welfare maximising result. This is the so-
cially optimal investment timings as long as the conditions ((−5(a−c)2/72φ)+
(76(β2 − β1)
2 + β1(55β1+ 20β2) + (130β1+ 20β2)(a− c))γ/(200φ)) ≤ 1, (9β
2
1 +
4(a − c)(3β1 + 2β2))γ)/(48φ) ≤ 1 and ((11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8(a − c)(β1 + β2) +
8β1β2)γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied.
2.2.4 Extension: Compulsory switch to NGN
In this extension we show what happens to the incumbent’s access price deci-
sions when there is compulsory switch to the NGN.14 In this case, the OLO’s
outside option would be exiting the market, as in Foros (2004). When the
OLO’s alternative is leaving the market entirely, the only circumstance under
which the OLO makes positive profits in the NGN is when it has more ability
to exploit the new network than the incumbent. When β2 < β1, indeed, the in-
cumbent is indifferent between charging an access price that extracts the OLO’s
profits entirely, or one that fully excludes the OLO from the NGN market.
Stage 2
Equilibrium quantities in stage 2 are unchanged compared to our basic
model.
The ex post participation conditions are different, since the copper network
option is not available anymore once the NGN investment is deployed. The
outside option scenario consists in the OLO exiting the market and the incum-
bent being monopolist:
pios1 =
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
, pios2 = 0
piof1 =
(
a− c
2
)2
, piof2 = 0
The ex post OLO’s participation conditions are the following:
• in case of success (
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥ 0
• in case of failure (
a− c− 2rlf
3
)2
≥ 0
14At present, mandatory switch of the legacy network is not included in the EU regulatory
framework.
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The above conditions require that:
rls ≤
a− c+ 2β2 − β1
2
rlf ≤
a− c
2
with l = P, F,RS.
Stage 1: the incumbent chooses the access price to the NGN
The incumbent’s profit function after investment is unchanged:
E(piP1 ) = γ((q
Ps∗
1 )
2 + rPsqPs∗2 ) + (1 − γ)(q
Pf∗
1 )
2 −∆φ/2
The expected access price chosen by the firm is the following:
rP∗ =
{
a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10 in case of success
a−c
2 in case of failure
The corresponding expected equilibrium quantities are the following:

E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
2 +
7β1−2β2
10
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
2
)
E(qP∗2 ) = γ
(
2(β2−β1)
5
)
As we can see, the incumbent always sells positive quantities, but the OLO
has non-negative quantities only if β2 > β1, i.e. with this access price level,
whenever the OLO is not at least as good as the incumbent in offering value-
added services, it will be excluded from the market. Alternatively, the incum-
bent can charge the constrained access price that verifies the OLO’s ex post
access condition with equality.
In the following we prove that, when β2 ≤ β1, the incumbent is indifferent
between charging the unconstrained access price that excludes the OLO and
charging the constrained access price that verifies the OLO’s ex post participa-
tion constraints with equality, rPconst∗, which is:
rPconst∗ =
{
a−c+2β2−β1
2 in case of success
a−c
2 in case of failure
The constrained access price in the equation above yields the following ex-
pected equilibrium quantities:
{
E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c+β1
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
2
)
E(qP∗2 ) = 0
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Therefore, the incumbent’s profits from exclusion, pio1 = γpi
os
1 + (1 − γ)pi
of
1 ,
or from market sharing with the constrained access price, piPs1 [rP=rPconst∗ ], are
the same:
pio1 =γ
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
+ (1 − γ)
(
a− c
2
)2
piPs1 [rP=rPconst∗ ] =γ
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
+ (1 − γ)
(
a− c
2
)2
When the OLO’s outside option is exiting the market entirely, if we assume
that when indifferent the incumbent favors market sharing, there is no case for
exclusion with partial regulation.
The access conditions though are less favorable to the OLO. Whenever the
OLO is not at least as good as the incumbent in offering value-added services,
its profits are driven down to zero. In our basic model instead, we find that
there is a case in which the OLO is worse than the incumbent in offering value-
added services but it earns positive profits and remains active in the market.
2.2.5 Risk Sharing
We model the risk sharing agreement as an exogenous alternative, to highlight
its potential improvements over social welfare outcomes. More specifically,
following Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), the risk sharing option is treated in
a reduced form in which parties share the fixed cost of investment through
some agreement and then they can use the NGN network without further side
payments. In this respect, risk sharing may be thought as a compulsory regime
imposed on firms by the regulator.15
In this setting we do not have the choice of access price, because firms first
compete on services using the copper network and then use the commonly
built NGN, without further side payments for the network usage. Therefore
we can directly analyse the choice of investment timing.
Stage 0: Joint choice of investment timing
The expected equilibrium quantities in the last stage of the risk sharing
15We do not address the specific nature of the risk sharing contracts in this paper. On this point,
Inderst and Peitz (2012b) analyse cost-sharing agreements between an incumbent firm and an en-
trant, in the form of long term contracts concluded before the investment is made, as opposed to
contracting taking place after the network has been constructed. The authors show that the for-
mer type of agreement reduces the duplication of investment and may lead to more areas being
covered. Coordination at the investment level may come at a price, though, which is reduced
competition in the areas thus covered.
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game write as below:

E(qRS∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c+2β1−β2
3
)
+ (1 − γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qRS∗2 ) = γ
(
a−c+2β2−β1
3
)
+ (1 − γ)
(
a−c
3
)
Assumption 2.4 ensures that both firms are active in the market, in every
state of demand.
The two firms choose the investment timing bymaximising the sum of their
expected profits, E(piRS12 ), considering the equilibrium quantities in the retail
market:
max
∆RS
E(piRS12 ) =(1−∆
RS)
2(a− c)2
9
+
∆RS
(
γ
(
(a− c+ 2β1 − β2)
2
9
+
(a− c+ 2β2 − β1)
2
9
)
+
(1− γ)
2(a− c)2
9
)
− (∆RS)2φ/2
Their choice yields the following timing for the investment in the NGN:
∆RS∗ =
(2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2β1β2)γ
9φ
∆RS∗ is the optimal timing of investment when incumbent and OLO enter
in a cooperation agreement for the construction of the NGN infrastructure only
if ((2(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2β1β2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1. The second-order
condition is always satisfied. Notice that the optimal ∆RS∗ would be zero if
there were no expected demand increase following the investment, i.e. β1 =
β2 = 0. Of course, the two firms would have no interest in investing in the
NGN technology if they believed there would be no market for their value-
added services.
Furthermore, it is interesting to analyse how such choice changes with the
difference in the ability to offer value-added services and therefore with the re-
turns from the investment. Comparative statics shows that the sign of d
dβi
∆RS∗
depends on the term 5βi − 4βj + a − c, with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Keeping β1
fixed, an increase in the value of β2 unambiguously yields to anticipating the
joint construction of the NGN, i.e. d
dβ2
∆RS∗ > 0, when 5β2 − 4β1 + a − c ≥ 0,
therefore, only when the OLO is better than the incumbent, or when the in-
cumbent is better than the OLO but not too much. When 5β2− 4β1+ a− c < 0,
the incumbent is considerably better than the OLO in offering value-added ser-
vices and an increase in the ability of the OLO delays the construction of the
NGN, i.e. d
dβ2
∆RS∗ < 0. This effect reflects the fact that, with risk sharing, the
two firms internalise the profit externalities generated by Cournot competition.
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Notice, indeed, that we encountered the same conditions for the solution to the
first-order condition in case of full regulation: rF∗ = 0 if 5β2 − 4β1 + a− c ≥ 0
and rF∗ > 0 if 5β2 − 4β1 + a− c < 0.
The socially optimal investment timing
As a benchmark for comparison, we compute the socially optimal invest-
ment timing in case of risk sharing, which is:
∆RSW =
(8(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1β2)γ
18φ
The equation above represents the socially optimal investment timing in
case of risk sharing as long as ((8(a−c)(β1+β2)+11(β1−β2)
2+8β1β2)γ)/18φ) ≤
1.
2.2.6 Comparison of results under partial regulation,
full regulation and risk sharing
We can derive the first insight from this model by comparing the results ob-
tained in case of partial access regulation, full access regulation and risk shar-
ing.
Proposition 2.2. For a given timing of investment ∆ and under the assumptions
rF ≥ 0 and 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), expected industry output E(Q
l(∆))
satisfies
E(QRS(∆)) >E(QP (∆))
E(QRS(∆)) ≥E(QF (∆))
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
In line with Nitsche andWiethaus (2011), risk sharing is expected to induce
more competition than partial regulation and full regulation regimes. The first
inequality E(QRS(∆)) > E(QP (∆)) arises because risk sharing involves no
wholesale transfers and a more symmetric market structure,16 whereas partial
regulation implies transfer from the OLO to the incumbent and an asymmet-
ric market structure, which reflects the lower level of competition. The second
16The possible difference in market shares reflects only the differences in abilities, not differences
in market power. If the two firms are equal in abilities, market structure is symmetric under risk
sharing.
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inequality E(QRS(∆)) ≥ E(QF (∆)) arises because, when the regulated access
price is constrained to zero by Assumption 3.1, risk sharing and full regulation
yield the same outcome in terms of expected total quantities, but when the reg-
ulated access price is positive, full regulation involves a positive transfer which
is higher than marginal cost of production, so the overall market efficiency is
higher under risk sharing.
The equilibrium results in terms of NGN access conditions and, consequen-
tially, investment incentives, change depending on the relative and absolute
value of firms’ abilities in offering value-added services. In Table 2.1, we com-
bine the various modes of regulation’s equilibrium outcomes, identifying five
different relevant parameters ranges. For ease of exposition, we name them as
following: P1F1RS, P2F1RS, P3F1RS, P3F2RS, P3F3RS.
Case P1F1RS describes the situation in which the OLO has considerably
more ability than the incumbent in offering value-added services through the
NGN. In this case, when the access price is not regulated, the incumbent chooses
the monopoly price, whereas the regulator would choose a negative access
price thatwe constrained to zero byAssumption 3.1. In the second case, P2F1RS,
the values of the two firms’ abilities are close to each other, either favoring the
incumbent or the OLO. Here, with partial regulation, the incumbent chooses
to charge a constrained access price that makes it indifferent for the OLO to
use the NGN or switch back to the copper network, while the full regulation
outcome is unchanged compared to the previous situation. As the OLO’s abil-
ity decreases with respect to the incumbent’s one, the incumbent finds it less
convenient to share the NGN market with the OLO, up to a point where it
prefers to provide the value-added services alone. Therefore in the range of
values P3F1RS, we obtain exclusion with partial regulation, while the access
price is zero with full regulation. When the incumbent becomes considerably
better than the OLO in boosting the demand, the regulator favors its activity
by imposing a positive regulated access price, but only insofar as that does not
exclude the OLO from the market - case P3F2RS. A positive regulated access
price together with non-exclusion is not possible if the difference between the
two firms’ abilities is important but their absolute values are low. In that case,
the OLO would prefer to use the regulated copper network if asked to pay for
the NGN, as in case P3F3RS where we have double exclusion, with full regu-
lation and with partial regulation. We do not look into this case, as explained
in section 2.2.2.
Proposition 2.3. Under the assumptions rF ≥ 0, 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), and
given the OLO’s participation constraints (2.2) and (2.4), the following results hold:
1. Both firms are active in the market no matter what is the regulatory regime, for β2 ≥
5β1/6
2. The OLO is excluded from the NGN market with partial regulation, for β2 < 5β1/6
3. The investment is undertaken later with full regulation and risk sharing with respect to
partial regulation: ∆F∗ < ∆P∗;∆RS∗ < ∆P∗
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Parameters Range Partial Regulation Full Regulation Risk Sharing
g > β2 ≥ β1 +
5(a−c)
6
P1F1RS
P1: E(rP∗) unconstrained, OLO in
the NGN market
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
β1 +
5(a−c)
6
> β2 ≥
5β1
6
P2F1RS
P2: E(rP∗) constrained, OLO in the
NGN market
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
5β1
6
> β2 ≥
4β1
5
− a−c
5
P3F1RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained, OLO‘s
EXCLUSION
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
If β1 >
2(a−c)
3
4β1
5
− a−c
5
> β2 ≥
3β1
4
− a−c
6
P3F2RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained, OLO‘s
EXCLUSION
F2: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO in the NGN market
RS: no upstream transfers
3β1
4
− a−c
6
> β2 > 0
P3F3RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained, OLO‘s
EXCLUSION
F3: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
RS: no upstream transfers
If β1 ≤
2(a−c)
3
4β1
5
− a−c
5
> β2 > 0
P3F3RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained, OLO‘s
EXCLUSION
F3: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
RS: no upstream transfers
Table 2.1: Relevant Parameters Thresholds
OLO’s ability β2
0 gβ1 +
5(a−c)
6
β1 = β2
5β1
6
4β1
5 −
a−c
5
3β1
4 −
a−c
6
if β1 >
2(a−c)
3
P1F1RS
P2F1RS
P3F1RS
P3F2RS
P3F3RS
Figure 2.4: Relevant parameter thresholds
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4. The investment is undertaken later with full regulation with respect to risk sharing when
the regulated access price is zero, while the relationship is ambiguous when the regulated
access price is positive: for β1 ≤ 2(a − c)/3, ∆
F∗ < ∆RS∗; ∆F∗ Q ∆RS∗, for β1 >
2(a− c)/3
5. The OLO’s ability to provide value-added services through the NGN affects the invest-
ment timing. The effect is positive with partial regulation, d
dβ2
∆P∗ > 0; negative with
full regulation, d
dβ2
∆F∗ < 0; ambiguous with risk sharing, where the impact of a firm’s
ability to offer value-added services on the investment timing changes from positive to
negative as β2’s absolute value decreases with respect to β1, or vice versa.
6. The investment is undertaken later with respect to the social optimum, under all regula-
tory regimes: ∆P∗ < ∆PW∗;∆F∗ < ∆FW∗; and∆RS∗ < ∆RSW∗.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
The OLO always benefits from a spillover effect from the construction of the NGN
done by the incumbent. Nevertheless, the incumbent can potentially capture some rent
by leasing its infrastructure to the rival. Under full access price regulation though, when
the OLO has more ability than the incumbent, the rent is set just equal to the marginal
cost by the regulator, so the incumbent earns nothing from the upstream market. In
this case, its investment incentive is dampened, since it cannot extract any benefit from
the OLO’s value-added services. Therefore, it chooses to invest later with respect to
the case without regulation. This confirms the finding in the literature that access price
regulation plays a disincentive role in the incumbent’s investment decision (Kotakorpi
(2006)). It is worth pointing out that, although in this model firms earn positive prof-
its in the full regulation case thanks to the Cournot competition assumption, a similar
result is found in a setting with Hotelling competition by Kotakorpi (2006). Less un-
certainty mitigates such effect: when the investment success becomes more likely, the
speed at which the incumbent delays its investment plans when β2 is higher decreases,
d2
dβ2dγ
∆F∗ < 0.
When β1 > 2(a − c)/3, there is a range of parameters, 3β1/4 − (a − c)/6 ≤ β2 <
4β1/5 − (a − c)/5, for which the regulated access price is positive, the OLO is active
in the NGN market with full regulation, but it is excluded with partial regulation. In
this case, partial regulation gives the highest investment incentive, but the relationship
between full regulation and risk sharing in terms of investment timing is ambiguous.
2.2.7 Welfare analysis
The previous analysis revealed that risk sharing induces the highest expected level of
competition downstream for a given investment timing, in line with Nitsche and Wi-
ethaus (2011), while partial regulation gives the strongest investment incentive. In this
section, we provide a comprehensive welfare ranking of the different modes of regula-
tion, broken down according to the range of parameter values shown in Figure 2.4. In
the AppendixA.1.4we report a detailed overview of the results. From these results, we
derive the following statement.
Proposition 2.4. Under the assumptions rF ≥ 0, 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), and
given the OLO’s participation constraints (2.2) and (2.4), the following results hold:
1. Expected consumer welfare is higher under risk sharing compared to partial regulation;
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2. When the OLO is better than the incumbent in offering value-added services, expected
total welfare is higher under risk sharing compared to partial regulation;
3. When the OLO is better than the incumbent in offering value-added services or when
the incumbent is better than the OLO by a great extent, expected consumer welfare and
expected total welfare are higher under partial regulation compared to full regulation.
Otherwise, the difference in total welfare and consumer welfare between partial and full
regulation remains ambiguous.
4. When the access price to the NGN is regulated at marginal cost, expected consumer wel-
fare and expected total welfare are higher under risk sharing compared to full regulation;
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
Once taken into account the equilibrium choice of investment timing, we find that
risk sharing yields a higher expected consumer surplus than full regulation. When the
regulated access price is zero, risk sharing also unambiguously yields a higher over-
all welfare than full regulation. However, when comparing partial regulation and risk
sharing, investment incentives and intensity of competition move in opposite direc-
tions, therefore the results in terms of expected consumer welfare and expected total
welfare change depending on the parameter values.
In particular, when the OLO is better in offering value-added services, the incum-
bent charges an access price that ensures the OLO‘s participation to the NGN with par-
tial regulation, while the access price is set to marginal cost with full regulation, i.e.
cases P1F1RS and P2F1RS with β2 ≥ β1. Under these circumstances, risk sharing is
unambiguously dominant, both from a total welfare and a consumer welfare viewpoint.
Even though risk sharing investment incentives are lower compared to partial regula-
tion, the higher competitive intensity more than compensates for the delay in building
the NGN.
When the incumbent is better in offering value-added services, the welfare anal-
ysis becomes less clear. In the range of parameters for which the incumbent charges
a constrained access fee and both firms are active in the NGN market, i.e. P2F2RS
with β2 < β1, we find that full regulation still yields the least desirable outcome, but
the relationship between partial regulation and risk sharing is ambiguous both from
a consumer welfare and a total welfare viewpoint. The trade-off between stronger in-
vestment incentives under partial regulation and higher competitive intensity under
risk sharing is less stark when the incumbent charges the lower constrained access fee.
Therefore, depending on the parameters, total welfare can be higher or lower under risk
sharing or partial regulation.
Finally, we analyse two cases in which the incumbent finds it more convenient to
exclude the OLO from the NGNmarket. In this case, the OLO offers broadband services
through the copper network, earning positive profits thanks to the regulated access
price. Under this circumstance, when the incumbent’s ability in offering value-added
services is not too high, i.e. β1 ≤ 2(a−c)/3, there is exclusionwith partial regulation and
a marginal cost access pricing with full regulation, i.e. P3F1RS. Risk sharing is still
unambiguously better than full regulation, both from a total welfare and a consumer
welfare perspective. The relationship between partial regulation and risk sharing in
terms of total welfare outcome is ambiguous.
When the incumbent’s ability in offering value-added services is high enough, i.e.
β1 > 2(a − c)/3, there is exclusion with partial regulation, and, for a certain range
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of parameters, the regulator sets an above cost access price to the NGN and the OLO
remains active in the NGN market, i.e. P3F2RS, with full regulation. In this case,
partial regulation investment incentives are so elevated that total welfare turns out to
be the highest compared to risk sharing and full regulation. The relationship between
risk sharing and full regulation in terms of total welfare is ambiguous: investment’s
incentives can be higher or lower depending on the parameters, but consumer welfare
is always higher with risk sharing.
2.3 Conclusion
In this paper we model the competition between a vertically-integrated incumbent firm
and a facilities-free OLO in the broadband market, where the former has the option
to invest in building a NGN that allows firms to drastically increase the quality and
variety of their services. Market success of the NGN in terms of demand increase is un-
certain. Differently from other studies that assume demand uncertainty, the investment
choice is analysed in a dynamic setting with differentiated products. The analysis is
conducted under three different possible modes of regulation: full regulation (the NGN
is regulated), partial regulation (the NGN is unregulated) and risk sharing (there are no
side payments between firms for the use of the NGN).
Our analysis reveals that the investment is always undertaken later than in the social
optimum in all modes of regulation. The investment choice is affected by the OLO’s
ability to offer value-added services. Such effect is positive with partial regulation and
negative with full regulation, while with risk sharing the effect changes from positive
for high values of the OLO’s ability, β2, to negative as the incumbent’s ability, β1 gets
considerably bigger than β2, and vice versa. Partial regulation always yields the earliest
investment compared to the other regulatory regimes, while risk sharing ensures the
highest level of competitive intensity.
Welfare outcomes reveal that risk sharing is the dominant regime in a consumer sur-
plus perspective. Expected consumer surplus is always higher under risk sharing than
under partial regulation, but also under full regulation for a large set of parameters.
In particular, when both firms are active, full regulation’s consumer surplus outcome
is the least preferable; only when the incumbent’s ability is so high that regulated ac-
cess price to the NGN is above marginal cost, the comparison of outcomes in terms of
consumer surplus between full regulation and risk sharing becomes ambiguous.
Furthermore, when the OLO is better in offering value-added services, risk sharing
is the dominant regime also from a total welfare perspective. When the incumbent is
better, instead, welfare comparisons between the three regulatory regimes become less
clear.
It is worth pointing out that these results are valid for the reduced form of risk
sharing that we have considered in this paper. Such form of risk sharing implies a long
term contract with no side payments for the use of the NGN, thereby excluding sources
of inefficiency from the market and increasing the level of competitiveness downstream.
More complicated contractual forms of risk sharing might arise in reality, which could
well make the welfare comparison with full regulation less favorable to risk sharing.
In terms of policy recommendations, we can state that, if risk sharing works smoothly,
as in the model, then it allows for welfare improvements compared to full regulation.
While, indeed, looking deeper into how risk sharing works is worth additional future
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research.
Our analysis sheds some conceptual light on the debate about what is the socially
preferable access regulation regime to prompt telecommunications network develop-
ment. The difference in firms’ ability to provide value-added services is important in
the context. It exerts influence on the investment choice and on the access pricing deci-
sions, which in turn affect market competition and social welfare. We find that demand
uncertainty requires a careful formulation of access regulation rules. A robust set of
rules should take into account the potential for an investment failure and provide rea-
sonable access conditions for the firms involved in all possible cases. Also, uncertainty
plays the role of delaying the investment decision in all regimes. According to our
analysis, risk sharing can be particularly beneficial for consumers and give fairly high
investment incentives at the same time. At this stage, it would also be interesting to
go further in the research to study how risk sharing agreement can be robust to the
inclusion of late entrants, to avoid that the construction of the NGN could possibly be-
come a new source of market power and thereof be unable to deploy all of its benefits.
It would also be interesting to make the choice to engage in a risk sharing agreement
endogenous. We leave these questions for future research.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
When 2(β2 − β1)/5 < (a − c)/3, partial regulation unconstrained access price gives
the OLO less profits than the outside option. The access price that verifies the OLO’s
participation constraint 2.4 with equality is:
a− c+ rPs + 2β2 − β1
3
=
a− c
3
rPs =
2β2 − β1
2
The incumbent will prefer to charge the access price corresponding to the equation
above, rather than to charge the unconstrained access price and exclude the OLO, as
long as the outside option profits from being the only provider of the value-added ser-
vices through the NGN are not higher than the market sharing profits:
piPs
1[rPs∗=
(2β2−β1)
2
]
≥ pio1(
a− c
3
+
β1
2
)2
+
(2β2 − β1)
2
(a− c)
3
≥
(
a− c
3
+
2β1
3
)2
The above inequality is unambiguously satisfied only for values of β’s such that the
incumbent‘s advantage in ability to offer value-added services is not too large:
6β2 ≥ 5β1
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Total expected quantities for a given investment timing, under the different modes of
regulation are the following:
• Partial regulation

E(QP ) = (1−∆P ) a−c
3
+∆P
(
2(a−c)
3
+
(
3β1+2β2
10
− a−c
6
)γ
))
if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
E(QP ) = (1−∆P ) a−c
3
+∆P
(
2(a−c)
3
+ β1γ
2
)
if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
E(QP ) = (1−∆P ) a−c
3
+∆P
(
2(a−c)
3
+ β1γ
3
)
if 6β2 < 5β1
• Full regulation

E(QF ) = (1−∆F ) a−c
3
+∆F
(
2(a−c)
3
+ (β1+β2)γ
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
E(QF ) = (1−∆F ) a−c
3
+∆F
(
(2β2 − β1)γ +
(a−c)(2+γ)
3
)
otherwise
• Risk sharing
E(QRS) = (1−∆RS)
a− c
3
+ ∆RS
(
2(a− c)
3
+
(β1 + β2)γ
3
)
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We now compare partial regulation and full regulation with risk sharing, consider-
ing the specific conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as defined in Table
2.1, and Assumption 2.4:
• if P1RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
10(2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ)
20(a − c) + (3(3β1 + 2β2)− 5(a− c))γ
10(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)− (20(a− c) + (3(3β1 + 2β2)− 5(a− c))γ) = (β2 −
β1
2
)γ > 0
• if P2RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ)
4(a− c) + 3β1γ
2(2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ)− (4(a− c) + 3β1γ) = (2β2 − β1)γ > 0
• if P3RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ
2(a− c) + β1γ
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ − (2(a− c) + β1γ) = β2γ > 0
• if F1RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
= 1
• if F2RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ
2(a− c) + (3(2β2 − β1) + (a− c))γ
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ − (2(a− c) + (3(2β2 − β1) + (a− c))γ) = (4β1 − 5β2 − (a− c))γ > 0
Therefore,E(QRS) > E(QP ); and E(QRS) ≥ E(QF ).
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
(1) and (2) Proof of these statements derives directly from Proposition 2.1.
(3) Investment timing: partial regulation vs full regulation and risk sharing
In order to compare investment timings we do the following computations, considering
each time the specific conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as defined
in Table 2.1, and Assumption 2.4:
• if P1F1
∆P
∆F
=
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2
20(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c)(2β1 − β2))
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2 − (20(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c)(2β1 − β2))) =
(5(a− c) + β1 + 4β2)
2 > 0
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• if P2F1
∆P
∆F
=
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))
4(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c) + 2β1 − β2)
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))− (4(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c) + 2β1 − β2)) =
4(2β2 − β1)(10(a− c) + 7β1 − 2β2) > 0
• if P3F1
∆P
∆F
=
4(a− c+ β21
(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c) + 2β1 − β2)
4(a− c+ β21)− (2β1 − β2)(2(a− c) + 2β1 − β2) = β2(a− c+ 4β1 − β2) > 0
• if P3F2
∆P
∆F
=
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)
−72(β1 − β2)2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)2
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)− (−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)
2) =
10(a− c)2 + 76(β1 − β2)
2 + β2(−55β1 + 68β2) + (a− c)(−59β1 + 81β2) > 0
• if P1RS
∆P
∆RS
=
25(a− c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2
20(5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)
25(a− c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2 − (20(5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)) =
25(a− c)2 + 10(5β1 − 4β2)(a− c)− 4(5β1 − 4β2)
2 + 9β1(9β1 − 8β2) > 0
• if P2RS
∆P
∆RS
=
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))
4(5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))− (4(5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)) =
(2β2 − β1)(2(a− c) + 11β1 − 10β2) > 0
• if P3RS
∆P
∆RS
=
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)
5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)− (5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2) =
− β21 + 2(a− c)(β1 − β2) + 8β1β2 − 5β
2
2 > 0
Therefore,∆F∗ < ∆P∗; and ∆RS∗ < ∆P∗.
(4) Investment timing: risk sharing vs full regulation
In order to compare investment timings we do the following computations, considering
each time the specific conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as defined
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in Table 2.1, and Assumption 2.4:
• if F1RS
∆RS
∆F
=
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c)(2β1 − β2))
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2 − ((2β1 − β2)(2(a− c)(2β1 − β2))) =
2(2β2 − β1)(a− c) + (2β2 − β1)
2 > 0
• if F2RS
∆RS
∆F
=
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
−72(β1 − β2)2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)2
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2−
(−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c) − 10(a − c)
2) =
10(a− c)2 + (83β2 − 61β1)(a− c) + 77(β1 − β2)
2 + β2(72β2 − 61β1) Q 0
Therefore, for β1 ≤ 2(a − c)/3, ∆
F∗ < ∆RS∗; for β1 > 2(a − c)/3 (the only case in
which there is no exclusion with a positive regulated access price),∆F∗ Q ∆RS∗ .
(5) Comparative statics
Our comparative statics results, considering the specific conditions under each relevant
parameter threshold, as defined in Table 2.1, and Assumption 2.4, are shown below:
• if P1
δ(∆P )
δ(β2)
=
2(β2 − β1)γ
5φ
> 0
• if P2
δ(∆P )
δ(β2)
=
(a− c)γ
3φ
> 0
• if P3, the OLO is not in the NGN market.
• if F1
δ(∆F )
δ(β2)
=
−(2(a− c+ 2β1 − β2)γ
9φ
< 0
• if F2
δ(∆F )
δ(β2)
=
(−9(a− c) + 23β1 − 32β2)γ
phi
< 0
• RS
δ(∆RS)
δ(β2)
=
2(a − c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
2(a− c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
> 0 if β2 > 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
2(a− c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
≤ 0 if β2 ≤ 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
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Therefore, d
dβ2
∆P∗ > 0; d
dβ2
∆F∗ < 0; and d
dβ2
∆RS∗ changing as shown above.
(6) Comparison of equilibrium investment timing and socially optimal investment
timing
The comparison of equilibrium investment timing and socially optimal investment tim-
ing in the different regulatory regimes give the following results, considering conditions
for each parameter range as defined in Table 2.1 and all other assumptions:
• if P1
∆PW
∆P
= −3((125(a−c)2)−30(3β1+2β2)(a−c)−15β1(β1+4β2)−108(β1−β2)
2) > 0
• if P2
∆PW
∆P
= −6β21 − 4(a− c)(β1 + 2β2) + (4(a− c)(3β1 + 2β2) + 9β
2
1) > 0
• if P3
∆PW
∆P
= 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1(β2 − β1) + 8β2(a− c) > 0
• if F1
∆FW
∆F
= 3(β21 + 4β2(a− c) + β2(3β2 − 2β1)) > 0
• if F2
∆FW
∆F
= 21(a−c)2+(180β2−126β1)(a−c)+171(β1−β2)
2+β2(153β2−126β1) > 0
• RS
∆RSW
∆RS
= (β1 + 2β2)(4(a− c) + β1 + 2β2) > 0
Therefore,∆P∗ < ∆PW∗;∆F∗ < ∆FW∗; and ∆RS∗ < ∆RSW∗.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Expected consumer welfare is defined as:
E(CSl) =∆l∗(CSC) + (1−∆l∗)E(CSl)
=∆l∗
(
(QC∗)2
2
)
+ (1−∆l∗)
(
γ
(
(Qls∗)2
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(Qlf∗)2
2
))
with Ql = ql1 + q
l
2.
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Expected total welfare is defined as:
E(W l) = ∆l∗
(
(QC∗)2
2
+ (qC∗1 )
2 + (qC∗2 )
2
)
+
(1−∆l∗)
(
γ
(
(Qls∗)2
2
+ (qls∗1 )
2 + rlsqls∗2 −∆
l∗φ/2 + (qls∗2 )
2
)
+
(1− γ)
(
(Qlf∗)2
2
+ (qlf∗1 )
2
−∆l∗φ/2 + (qlf∗2 )
2
))
Our analysis reveal the following ranking of expected total welfare and expected
consumer welfare, respectively. Notice that the results are broken down according to
the relevant parameter thresholds defined in Table 2.117.

E(WRS) > E(WP ) > E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P1/P2F1RS, with β2 ≥ β1
E(WRS) Q E(WP ) > E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P2F1RS, with β2 < β1
E(WRS) > E(WF ) ; E(WRS) Q E(WP ) ; E(WP ) Q E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F1RS
E(WP ) > E(WRS) Q E(WF )] if β2,β1 s.t. P3F2RS


E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) > E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P1/P2F1RS
E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) Q E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F1RS
E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) Q E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F2RS
We now proceed by analysing each single statement contained in Proposition 2.4.
(1) Consumer welfare: risk sharing vs partial regulation
In order to compare consumer welfare outcomes it is sufficient to compare total quanti-
ties. So we check under each of the specific parameter thresholds, defined in Table 2.1
and find: 

QP
QRS
< 0 if P1RS
QP
QRS
< 0 if P2RS
QP
QRS
< 0 if P3RS
Therefore,E(CSRS) > E(CSP ).
(2) Total welfare: risk sharing vs partial regulation and (3) Total welfare and con-
sumer welfare: partial regulation vs full regulation
From the results above, we derive that, in all cases in which β2 ≥ β1, namely P1F1RS
and P2F1RS (only for the part in which β2 ≥ β1): W
RS > WP > WF . Furthermore,
when the incumbent is better than the OLO by a great extent and the regulated access
price is positive, case P3F2, we have: WP > WF .
(4) Total welfare and consumer welfare: risk sharing vs full regulation In order to
compare consumer welfare outcomes it is sufficient to compare total quantities. So we
check under each of the specific parameter thresholds, defined in Table 2.1 and find:
{
QF
QRS
< 0 if F1RS
QF
QRS
Q 0 if F2RS (happening without exclusion only if β1 > 2(a− c)/3)
17Since expressions are cumbersome, detailed equations are available from the authors upon
request.
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Therefore, E(CSRS) > E(CSF ) when the access price is regulated at cost, and the
relationship is ambiguous when the access price is positive. Also, from the results above
we obtain that only in case F1: WRS > WF .
(5) Total welfare and consumer welfare: full regulation ranking From the results
above, we can conclude that, in all cases in which there is no exclusion of the OLO
from the NGN market, namely P1F1RS and P2F1RS: WRS > WF and WP > WF ;
CSRS > CSF and CSP > CSF .
Appendix 2.B Extension:Full Regulation with Sin-
gle Access Charge
In this Extension we look at the case in which the regulator chooses a single access
charge to the NGN independent of demand.
Stage 2: Retail market competition
Expected demand functions are unchanged with respect to our basic model:
E[pF1 ] =γ(a+ β1 − q
Fs
1 − q
Fs
2 ) + (1− γ)(a− q
Ff
1 − q
Ff
2 )
E[pF2 ] =γ(a+ β2 − q
Fs
1 − q
Fs
2 ) + (1− γ)(a− q
Ff
1 − q
Ff
2 )
Expected profit functions faced by the firms in the NGN market are now:
E[piF1 ] =γ((p
Fs
1 − c)q
Fs
1 + rˆ
F qFs2 ) + (1− γ)((p
Ff
1 − c)q
Ff
1 + rˆ
F qFf2 )− (∆
F )φ/2
E[piF2 ] =γ((p
Fs
2 − c)q
Fs
2 − rˆ
F qFs2 ) + (1− γ)((p
Ff
2 − c)q
Ff
2 − rˆ
F qFf2 )− (∆
F )φ/2
where rˆF is the single access charge set by the regulator for the NGN; pFhi is the
demand in case of success, with i = 1, 2, and h = s, f for success and failure; qFs1 is the
quantity, with i = 1, 2, and h = s, f for success and failure;∆F is the investment timing
chosen by the incumbent in the full regulation case; φ is a positive cost parameter.
The copper network market looks exactly the same as in our basic model.
The first-order conditions give the following equilibrium quantities in the retail
market for the NGN:
• in case of successful investment{
qFs∗1 =
a−c+2β1−β2+rˆ
F
3
qFs∗2 =
a−c+2β2−β1−2rˆ
F
3
• in case of unsuccessful investment{
qFf∗1 =
a−c+rˆF
3
qFf∗2 =
a−c−2rˆF
3
Wemaintain the fundamental assumptions of the model on the parameters, namely:
Assumption 2.3. rF ≥ 0 and rC = 0
Assumption 2.4. 2βi ≥ βj , ∀i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j
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Assumption 2.4 is sufficient to ensure that both firms will be active in the market,
provided that the access charge is not too high.
The OLO participation condition to the NGN market, considered the new equilib-
rium quantities, is the following:
rˆF ≤
a− c+ γ(2β2 − β1)−
√
(a− c)2 − γ(1− γ)(2β2 − β1)2
2
Notice that for γ = 1, this condition equals Condition 2.5 in our basic model.
Stage 1: the regulator sets the access price to the NGN
The regulator sets a single access fee to the NGN in order to maximise social welfare.
Its objective function after investment is the following:
E(WˆNF ) =γ
(
(qFs∗1 + q
Fs∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFs∗1 )
2 + rˆF qFs∗2 −∆φ/2 + (q
Fs∗
2 )
2
)
(1− γ)
(
(qFf∗1 + q
Ff∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFf∗1 )
2 + rˆF qFf∗2 −∆φ/2 + (q
Ff∗
2 )
2
)
The first-order condition with respect to rˆF gives the access price as:
rˆF = c− a+ γ(4β1 − 5β2)
c − a < 0 is a necessary condition for a broadband market to exist. If β1 > β2 so
much that γ(4β1 − 5β2) > a− c, then the solution to the first-order condition given by
the expression above is positive, rˆF∗ > 0, and it constitutes the regulated access price.
Notice that the single access chargemakes it less likely that the socially optimal rˆF is
positive, i.e. the range of parameters shrinks with respect to our basic model, meaning
that the chance for the incumbent to be awarded of its higher ability in offering service,
and thereby to actually benefit of its own investment in case of success, decreases.
If, otherwise, the incumbent is worse than the OLO in offering value-added services,
β1 ≤ β2, or if it is better in offering value-added services but not by a great extent,
β1 > β2 but γ(4β1 − 5β2) < a− c, the solution to the first-order condition is lower than
the incumbent’s marginal cost of network operations, i.e. rˆF∗ < 0. This contradicts our
Assumption 3.1, according to which rˆF∗ ≥ 0, so in this case we will impose rˆF∗ = 0,
such that the optimal regulated access price will be set equal to the marginal cost.
By substituting the values for rˆF∗ into the expressions for the equilibrium quanti-
ties, we obtain the following expected quantities:
• for γ(4β1 − 5β2) ≤ a− c (i.e. when rˆ
F∗ = 0)
E(qF∗1 ) =γ
(
a− c+ 2β1 − β2
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(a− c
3
)
E(qF∗2 ) =γ
(
a− c+ 2β2 − β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(a− c
3
)
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• otherwise (i.e. when rˆF∗ is above cost)
E(qF∗1 ) =γ
(
2β1 − β2 + γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
)
+
(1− γ)
(
γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
)
E(qF∗2 ) =γ
(
a− c+
2β2 − β1 − 2γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
)
+
(1− γ)
(
a− c− 2
γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
)
Comparing the profits obtainable by the OLO with the outside option with those
obtainable by participating to the NGN, in case of failure (the stricter condition), we
find that the OLO decides to opt for the NGN in case of failure as long as the following
condition is satisfied:
(a− c
3
)2
≤
(
a− c− 2
γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
)2
where the left hand side represents the OLO’s profits in the outside option and the
right hand side represents the OLO’s profits in the NGN market, in case of failure.
From the above condition we draw that whenever rˆF∗ is above cost, in case of failure,
the OLO prefers to stay out of the NGN market.
Furthermore, it is clear that the condition for the incumbent to gain revenues from
leasing the network in the upstream segment identifies a smaller range of parameter
values compared to our basic model.
OLO’s ability β2
0 g
4β1
5 −
a−c
5γ
rˆF∗ = γ(4β1 − 5β2)− a+ c
Exclusion operated
by the regulator rˆ
F∗ = 0
Figure 2.5: Full Regulation: Case of failure
Graphically, the situation would be twofold. In case of failure, we would have a
situation like in Figure 2.5, while in case of success we would have a situation like in
Figure 2.6. The parameter threshold for exclusion in case of success comes from the
OLO’s participation condition after simple algebra.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing
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OLO’s ability β2
0 g
4β1
5 −
a−c
5
β1
2 + γ(4β1 − 5β2)− a+ c
Exclusion operated
by the regulator
rˆF∗ = γ(4β1 − 5β2) − a+ c
rˆF∗ = 0
Figure 2.6: Full Regulation: Case of success
The incumbent will have different objective functions depending on the parameters.
In particular, when γ(4β1−5β2 ≤ a−c)we have that rˆ
F∗ = 0. Therefore the incumbent
makes no profit in the upstream market and the situation is unchanged with respect to
our basic model.
When γ(4β1 − 5β2) > a − c, we have that rˆ
F∗ > 0, then the incumbent’s objective
function is:
max
∆ˆF
E(piF1 ) =(1− ∆ˆ
F )
(a− c
3
)2
+
∆ˆF
(
γ((2β1 − β2 + γ(4β1 − 5β2))
2+
(c− a+ γ(4β1 − 5β2))(a− c+
2β2 − β1 − 2γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
))+
(1− γ)
(
γ(4β1 − 5β2)
3
)2)
− (∆F )2φ/2
The resulting investment timing, ∆ˆF , is:
∆ˆF∗ =
{
(2(a−c)(2β1−β2)+(2β1−β2)
2)γ
9φ
if γ(4β1 − 5β2) ≤ a− c
(29β2−19β1)(4β1−5β2)γ
2+9γ(7β1−9β2)(a−c)+γ(2β1−β2)
2
−10(a−c)2)γ
9φ
otherwise
This is the incumbent optimal investment timing as long as the conditions ((2(a −
c)(2β1 − β2) + (2β1 − β2)
2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 and ((29β2 − 19β1)(4β1 − 5β2)γ
2 + 9γ(7β1 −
9β2)(a− c) + γ(2β1 − β2)
2 − 10(a − c)2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied.
Notice that if γ = 1 the optimal timing here coincides with the optimal timing in
our basic model, therefore, being γ less or equal to 1, we observe that, in case of single
regulated access charge, the investment timing is further delayed with respect to the
case with access charge dependent on demand, as analysed in our basic model.
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